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Command Policy

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-2, *Inspector General - The Inspection System*, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.2, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*, and Technical Order (T.O.) 11N-25-1, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*. It provides guidance and procedures for Air Force inspection and nuclear surety programs. Only this instruction may establish service-wide inspection requirements. Records disposition: maintain and dispose of records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication in accordance with AFMAN 37-139, *Records Disposition Schedule*.

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Chapter 1

RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1. Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG). Reports on force readiness to the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF). Approves inspection policy and oversees the Air Force inspection system. Serves as the Air Force point of contact for notification of evaluations by Air Force-level and non-Air Force organizations. As required, directs assessment of any Air Force program or operation, including Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) organizations and units. Informs commanders on the Eagle Look management review process and solicits review topics and sponsors from the Secretariat, Air Staff, and Major Commands (MAJCOM). Provides comments to MAJCOMs, direct reporting units (DRU), and field operating agencies (FOA) on the adequacy of their Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) and Compliance Inspection (CI) programs. Approves Air Force Special Interest Items (SII). Chairs the Air Force Intelligence Oversight (IO) Panel and provides quarterly reports to OSD.

1.2. Secretary of the Air Force, General Counsel (SAF/GC). Acts as legal counsel for all Air Force IO issues. Provides advice to intelligence components on questions of legality or propriety.

1.3. Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (HQ USAF/XOI). Develops policy to ensure the proper supervision and control of Air Force intelligence activities. Maintains AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, which provides guidance on the scope and applicability of the Air Force IO Program.

1.4. All Other Secretariat and HQ USAF Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS). Submit and sponsor Eagle Look management review topics. Review MAJCOM ORI criteria upon request of the Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General, Inspections Directorate (SAF/IGI). Provide functional guidance on readiness and compliance items subject to inspection/assessment.

1.5. Chief of Safety (HQ USAF/SE). Oversees the nuclear surety program in coordination with SAF/IG.

1.6. Major Commands (MAJCOM). Establish inspection programs consistent with command mission requirements to assess unit readiness, compliance, and other Air Force inspection program elements outlined in [Chapter 2](#). Develop inspection criteria and, as applicable, provide to the AFRC IG and the National Guard Bureau IG for review. Send an electronic version of MAJCOM supplements to this instruction to SAF/IGI at saf/igi@pentagon.af.mil. Provide functional guidance/checklists, as required for readiness and compliance items subject to inspection. Designate a point of contact (Gatekeeper) for notification of evaluations by all Air Force and non-Air Force organizations. Submit proposed Eagle Look management review topics and a quarterly schedule of projected inspection activity to the Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) for coordination.

1.7. MAJCOMs With Nuclear-Capable Assigned/Gained Units.

1.7.1. Conduct inspections required by this AFI.

1.7.2. Send a message and formal report on all nuclear inspections to the addressees listed in [Attachment 3](#), [Attachment 4](#) and paragraph [3.9](#). (as applicable). Include details on all limiting factors

(LIMFACS), critical and major deficiencies, corrective actions immediately applied, and deficiencies or unusual situations that affect the safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems.

1.7.3. Provide the inspected unit a report within 30 calendar days.

1.7.4. For all critical and major deficiencies, ensure final NSI reports include the complete description of each validated deficiency, the root cause, and the impact of the deficiency on the safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems.

1.7.5. Develop NSI criteria and include all applicable functions listed in paragraph 3.5.. Send a copy of proposed criteria to HQ AFSC/SEW, 9700 Avenue G SE, Kirtland AFB NM, 87117-5670, for review and approval. Publish approved criteria as a MAJCOM supplement to this AFI.

1.7.6. Develop NSI checklists (with references). Send copies of checklists and changes to HQ AFSC/SEW.

1.7.7. Comply with Chapter 3 (paragraph 3.8.) on Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) inspection reports. Appoint a Corrective Action Report Status (CARS) program monitor to track corrective actions for all DTRA inspection reports.

1.8. Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA). Conducts inspections/assessments, management reviews, and investigations as directed by SAF/IG (see Chapter 4).

1.9. Air Force Safety Center, Weapons, Space, Nuclear Safety Division (AFSC/SEW).

1.9.1. Develops Air Force policy, plans, guidance, and procedures for conducting NSIs.

1.9.2. Reviews critical and major deficiencies identified in MAJCOM NSI reports. Requests clarification of deficiencies.

1.9.3. Approves requests for waivers or deferments of nuclear inspections required by this AFI.

1.9.4. Provides observers when Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Albuquerque Operations (DTRA/AO) inspects Air Force units according to the memorandum of agreement between SAF/IG and the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

1.9.5. Reviews MAJCOM actions taken to correct deficiencies identified during DTRA/AO inspections and endorses them to DTRA. If AFSC or DTRA nonconcur, returns corrective action responses to MAJCOM for clarification.

1.9.6. Provides augmentees for NSIs when requested by the MAJCOM.

1.9.7. Responsible for nuclear surety aspects of AFI 91-series publications and specific parts of other directives (AFMAN 36-2105, *Officer Classification*; AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*; and AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Material*).

1.9.8. Oversees 25% of the total annual MAJCOM-conducted NSIs on a non-interference basis. The AFSC team chief will provide the MAJCOM team chief a brief, unrated, written assessment of observations identifying possible areas for improving the NSI process. Conducts oversight of Limited Nuclear Surety Inspections (LNSIs) and Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections (INSIs) as deemed necessary by AFSC.

1.9.9. Schedules NSI oversight visits with MAJCOM NSI teams. Oversight visits are not inspections, reports are not prepared, and concurrence with NSI team findings is not required. Such visits are coordinated under the IG Trusted Agent system to protect the minimum or no-notice aspect of the inspection.

1.9.10. Provides a summary and analysis of NSI and LNSI data to the Air Force Chief of Safety (HQ USAF/SE) for inclusion in the semiannual NSI results analysis briefing to CSAF.

Chapter 2

AIR FORCE INSPECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

2.1. Inspection Philosophy. Independent inspections are conducted by MAJCOM/IGs, AFIA, and functional staffs to provide the SECAF, CSAF, and MAJCOM/CCs a status report on unit efficiency, effectiveness, and combat readiness. In this regard, MAJCOMs will establish inspection programs consistent with MAJCOM mission requirements to inspect unit readiness, compliance, and other inspection program elements outlined in this chapter. They will develop applicable guidelines, procedures, and criteria for conducting these inspections. The common core criteria described in [Attachment 5](#) will be used to inspect applicable aspects of unit readiness. As a minimum, Air Force-level compliance inspection items identified in [Attachment 6](#) will be assessed during compliance inspections.

2.1.1. It is Air Force policy to minimize inspection footprint to the extent practical, commensurate with MAJCOM/FOA requirements. The use of sampling techniques, combined inspections, credit for unit activity in conjunction with exercises and contingencies, and other measures of sustained performance are encouraged. MAJCOMs will determine the minimum level of unit activity required for inspection credit/ratings.

2.1.2. MAJCOM functional staffs will develop inspection checklist items for use by command IG teams. MAJCOM IGs will ensure critical items requiring direct IG evaluation are clearly annotated.

2.2. Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). ORIs are used to evaluate the ability of units with a war-time or contingency mission to conduct assigned operational missions. Units are evaluated on how well they respond, employ forces, provide mission support, and survive and operate in a hostile environment. For units assigned to USAFE, NATO Tactical Evaluations (TACEVAL) may be substituted for ORI credit.

2.2.1. IG teams should focus on mission performance. Academic testing should not be used as a primary measure of readiness unless it serves a specific inspection objective, or hands on performance cannot be observed.

2.2.2. ORIs evaluate a unit's ability to perform Designed Operational Capability (DOC)/Mission Essential Task List (METL) associated taskings and assigned OPLAN taskings. Units must be ready to meet the full range of potential assigned taskings. IGs should periodically assess units against robust OPLAN taskings.

2.2.3. IG teams should attempt to create a realistic environment for evaluation to the extent possible. ORI scenarios should evaluate both sustained performance and contingency response. Safety must not be compromised.

2.2.4. Advance notice to inspected units for ORIs will be the minimum necessary consistent with realistic assessment scenarios, support asset scheduling, etc. For Air Reserve Component (ARC) units, advance notice will be approximately one year.

2.2.5. The five-tier rating system is normally used for grading ORI performance, except where deemed inappropriate for specific mission elements.

2.2.6. Inspections may be combined with those of other MAJCOMs, exercises, and contingency events when practical. Coordinate activities with unified/component commands, as applicable. IG teams may deploy to forward locations and headquarters during exercises and contingency operations.

to evaluate processes and performance. Inspectors may observe, but will not interfere with real world activities, unless a serious situation dictates.

2.2.7. Sampling, using standard mathematically valid statistical models, should be employed when practical as an evaluation method.

2.2.8. While conducting a Nuclear ORI (NORI), applicable areas of nuclear surety will be inspected as a subset of the overall readiness inspection.

2.2.8.1. Where applicable, nuclear surety criteria will be applied IAW [Chapter 3](#).

2.2.8.2. Nuclear surety will be reported in a separate area of the ORI report or as a separate report.

2.2.8.3. The MAJCOM IG team chief is responsible for determining the impact of nuclear surety deficiencies on the overall rating for the ORI.

2.3. Compliance Inspection (CI). CIs are used to evaluate unit compliance with higher headquarters directives. They focus primarily on those items identified by the MAJCOM/FOA/DRU commander and functional staffs, and those actions required by law, executive orders, DoD directives, and safety guidelines that, if not complied with, could result in significant legal liabilities, penalties or significant mission impact. Minimum Air Force-level Compliance Inspection Items (CIIs) are outlined in [Attachment 6](#). A tiered rating system that clearly indicates whether or not these items are in compliance with minimum standards will be established.

2.4. Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI). Refer to guidance in [Chapter 3](#).

2.5. Other Inspections. MAJCOM/CCs may establish additional inspection requirements to evaluate various mission elements. These should be kept to the minimum necessary consistent with mission requirements.

2.5.1. Contracted Support Activity Inspection (CSAI). CSAIs evaluate contractor compliance with contract requirements. They may be conducted in conjunction with an ORI, CI, or NSI. When conducted, CSAI reports are published separate from other inspection reports.

2.5.2. Unit Self-Inspection. MAJCOMs should establish self-inspection program guidelines for subordinate units. The intent is to provide commanders with a tool for internal assessment of unit health and to complement external inspections and assessments.

2.5.2.1. Self-inspection programs should be tailored to each unit's structure and mission, and contain mechanisms that ensure adequate coverage of the organization's mission, resources, training, and people programs. Mechanisms may consist of periodically administered checklists, quality control reviews, internal audits, functional inspections, management information systems, numerical summaries, analysis programs, etc.

2.6. Common Core Criteria (CCC). MAJCOMs will develop inspection guidelines and ORI criteria, and use the common-core criteria guidance described below as it applies to their units (see [Attachment 5](#)).

2.6.1. CCC Purpose. CCC identify key Air Force readiness inspection items that MAJCOM IGs should evaluate, as applicable, during ORIs or other inspections. MAJCOM IGs will evaluate functions and units to ensure they meet required standards for mobilizing, deploying, and employing their

personnel and assets. This Air Force-level oversight ensures that Air Force units, regardless of MAJCOM, can meet unified commanders' wartime or contingency requirements. MAJCOM IGs should use [Attachment 5](#) in developing specific criteria to inspect MAJCOM-assigned unit mission capabilities.

2.6.2. Criteria Application. CCC are applied to four major areas: Initial Response, Employment, Mission Support, and Ability to Survive and Operate. Within each, selected subareas are listed and general evaluation guidelines are described. MAJCOMs should apply these major areas and subareas, as applicable, to their mission(s) and supplement them, as required, to develop comprehensive inspections for MAJCOM-assigned units.

2.7. Rating System.

2.7.1. A five-tier rating system consists of the grades Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory.

2.7.2. Where applicable, a simplified tier system, such as combat ready/not combat ready, mission ready/not mission ready, in compliance/not in compliance, pass/fail, satisfactory/unsatisfactory, etc. or any of the above with comment as a third tier may be used.

2.7.3. Inspection team chiefs may assign ratings that accurately reflect observed performance regardless of statistical outcomes. Specific criteria are designed as a guide and are not a substitute for the judgment of the inspector. However, when ratings differ significantly from established criteria, the rationale should be explained.

2.8. Inspector Training. MAJCOMs, DRUs, and FOAs with established IG teams will ensure inspectors attend the Air Force Inspectors Course or receive MAJCOM equivalent training as soon as possible after assignment to an IG team. Other personnel may be scheduled for this training based on involvement with inspection programs.

2.8.1. MAJCOMs will establish training programs to ensure augmentees are prepared to conduct inspections in their area of expertise.

2.9. Special Interest Item (SII) Policy and Instructions.

2.9.1. Purpose. The SII process provides a means to focus management attention, gather data, and/or evaluate the status of specific programs and conditions in the field. It can also be used to determine the degree of compliance with directives, policies, and procedures, gather information on known or suspected problems, identify specific deficiencies, or to confirm a problem has been resolved. Functional staffs analyze feedback from SIIs to facilitate decision-making and policy adjustments.

2.9.2. Policy. SAF/IG is the approval authority for Air Force SIIs. It determines the appropriateness of proposals and may direct assessment by means other than SII if deemed more appropriate. Proposed Air Force-wide SII topics may originate at any level, but are normally sponsored by a MAJCOM or HQ DCS. Approved SIIs may include a requirement for a one-time unit self-assessment to establish a baseline for the SII topic. In this case, IGs will validate results during applicable regularly scheduled inspections. SIIs are normally rated using a simplified rating scale such as satisfactory/unsatisfactory.

2.9.3. Categories. The sponsor of an Air Force-wide SII considers one of two categories:

2.9.3.1. Long-Term SII. Long-term SIIs are used when an issue is pervasive and is of major importance Air Force-wide or when evaluating compliance in a specific area of concern. The time period is normally one year. This may be extended on a case-by-case basis.

2.9.3.2. Short-Term SII. Short-term SIIs include subject areas with a limited scope or issues that are analyzed from data based on past inspections or from results of a one-time survey. The time period is less than one year.

2.9.4. Responsibilities.

2.9.4.1. SAF/IGI establishes policy governing SIIs, manages requests for SIIs, and obtains SAF/IG approval. Following approval, SAF/IGI implements Air Force-wide SIIs by distributing SIIs to tasked MAJCOM/FOA/DRU IGs, correlating returned data and preparing reports as required. SII reports (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0008) are forwarded through SAF/IG to the sponsoring agency.

2.9.4.2. Sponsoring agencies provide SAF/IGI with justification, suggested inspection guides and grading criteria per paragraph [2.9.5](#).

2.9.4.3. AFIA evaluates SIIs during AFIA-conducted compliance inspections and provides results to SAF/IGI.

2.9.4.4. MAJCOMs, DRUs, and FOAs assist functional staffs in developing SII requests, and inspect and report on Air Force SIIs as specified in the SII implementation notification instructions. Implementation, inspection, and reporting procedures may vary as directed by SAF/IGI depending on the needs and urgency of the requesting agency.

2.9.5. Format and Request Procedures. Submit SII requests to SAF/IGI in the following format:

2.9.5.1. Subject. Proposed title of SII.

2.9.5.2. Purpose. Formulate a clear statement of the problem. State the goals and objectives of the SII, what information is desired, and how the sponsor intends to use the data.

2.9.5.3. SII Category. Specify category requested (i.e., long-term or short-term).

2.9.5.4. Background. Provide sufficient background information to give inspectors an insight to the problem.

2.9.5.5. Inspection Guide. Include a comprehensive inspection guide for units to apply in self-inspections and inspectors to evaluate the SII topic. This guide should include specific questions to ask and procedures for evaluating the topic.

2.9.5.6. Rating Criteria. Specify rating criteria. Normally use a simplified rating scale such as satisfactory/unsatisfactory. The sponsoring agency must include precise criteria inspectors will use to determine ratings, based on the sponsor-provided inspection guide.

2.9.6. Reporting Requirements. MAJCOM, DRU, and FOA IGs will document the results of SII inspections as a separate section of the evaluation/inspection report or as a stand-alone report. A unit is not required to be inspected more than once during the duration of an SII.

2.9.7. MAJCOMs may establish MAJCOM-specific SIIs for subordinate units. MAJCOM-specific SIIs will not conflict with, or supersede, Air Force SIIs.

2.10. Best Practices. MAJCOM/IGs and AFIA inspectors will record observed Best Practices as an unclassified addendum to all inspection reports. Best practices are designated by the inspection team

chief based on coordination with appropriate MAJCOM functional experts. Do not include the privileged document statement on these records, as they will be releasable both within and outside the Air Force unless otherwise directed. Send all addenda to AFMIA IAW [Attachment7](#).

2.11. Inspection Scheduling and Coordination.

2.11.1. Inspectors General will identify a trusted agent authorized to release close hold, no-notice inspection schedules to AFIA/CC. AFIA/CC publishes the combined inspection schedule quarterly. Personnel assigned to the SAF/IGI and AFIA staffs are designated as trusted agents. Trusted agents will not divulge information to unauthorized personnel. Commanders at all levels must ensure the integrity of the trusted agent system.

2.11.2. MAJCOM IG teams coordinate with their MAJCOM Gatekeepers, headquarters staffs, AFIA, and AFAA points of contact to ensure staff assistance visits (SAVs), audit schedules, and topics do not duplicate or conflict with inspection schedules or topics. AFIA and AFAA will coordinate centrally directed audits and inspection topics to avoid duplication of effort. For ARC units, MAJCOM IGs will coordinate their inspection schedule, frequency, etc. with ARC IGs.

2.11.3. Commanders and staffs notify IG teams of schedule conflicts based on operational or exercise taskings.

2.11.4. Commanders ensure key management personnel are on duty and available to DoD IG, AFIA, or other established IG team inspectors.

2.12. Gatekeeper Functions.

2.12.1. SAF/IGI, MAJCOM, and NGB Gatekeepers monitor and deconflict, to the extent practical, the type and amount of evaluation activity in Air Force units.

2.12.2. SAF/IGI Gatekeeper Responsibilities.

2.12.2.1. Serves as the Air Force focal point for notification of Air Force-level and non- Air Force evaluations.

2.12.2.2. Assists MAJCOM/NGB Gatekeepers in deconflicting schedules, as necessary.

2.12.2.3. Relays visit notifications to appropriate MAJCOM/NGB Gatekeepers.

2.12.2.4. Publishes AF Gatekeeper guidance.

2.12.3. MAJCOM and NGB Gatekeeper Responsibilities.

2.12.3.1. Establish a Gatekeeper program.

2.12.3.2. Monitor all evaluation visits to installations to deconflict schedules and minimize impact on field units. MAJCOM Gatekeepers do not have authority to deny access to inspectors/ auditors from agencies outside their MAJCOM. If attempts at deconfliction fail, SAF/IGI may assist with external deconfliction.

2.12.3.3. Evaluate inspection visit requests to determine if visits are duplicative to on-going or recent efforts of other agencies.

2.13. Inspection Report Handling.

2.13.1. Classification. Inspectors must mark unclassified reports and portions of reports "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) if they contain FOUO information (AF Supplement to DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, DoD Freedom of Information Act Program). Mark reports containing classified information as prescribed by DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, *DoD Information Security Program*, and AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*.

2.13.2. Releasability. Reports of inspection are privileged documents and the Air Force controls their distribution. The following statement must appear on the cover and in the body of each report: "This is a PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT that cannot be released in whole or part to persons or agencies outside the Department of Defense, nor can it be republished in whole or part in any publication not containing this statement, including Air Force/DoD magazines and general use pamphlets, without the express approval of the Secretary of the Air Force." Include similar statements on reports of inspections conducted jointly with inspection teams from DoD agencies.

2.13.2.1. Reports may be released in whole or part within DoD at MAJCOM/IG discretion. Summary inspection results may be released for inclusion in base and local newspapers. Contact SAF/IG for approval to release reports in whole or part outside DoD.

2.13.2.2. MAJCOM IGs will maintain a record of the official requests for inspection reports processed by their offices. Old reports marked " PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT " will be maintained or destroyed IAW DoD Regulation 5400.7-R guidance for FOUO material.

2.13.2.3. Commanders will ensure the privileged status of inspection reports is protected.

2.13.3. Distribution: Send one hardcopy or electronic version of all inspection reports to SAF/IGI, 1140 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1140, safigi@pentagon.af.mil. Availability of reports on internet sites does not satisfy this requirement.

Chapter 3

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) PROGRAM

3.1. NSI Program Guidance. When inspecting a nuclear-capable unit, inspection teams follow the inspection procedures in this instruction, in addition to guidance contained in T.O. 11N-25-1, Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System. Each unit's management of nuclear resources will be evaluated against approved safety, security, and reliability standards.

3.1.1. Final ratings will be based on the guidance in T.O. 11N-25-1, paragraph 3-1.

3.1.2. Evaluate logistics airlift units with nuclear weapons transport missions by observing loading, transporting, unloading, and custody transfer procedures of representative types of weapons. The team should conduct the inspection (other than an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection) during missions involving war reserve (WR) weapons when available. The inspection team will not require the unit to perform additional weapon handling operations if a WR mission is evaluated and rated at least "Satisfactory".

3.1.3. During an inspection, do not use an inspector as part of a unit's Two-Person Concept team (see AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*). During airlift missions and when unescorted entry to restricted areas is authorized, two properly cleared inspectors certified under the PRP may form their own Two-Person Concept team.

3.1.4. Whenever possible, evaluate a unit's technical proficiency by using WR weapons that are due (at the time of the inspection) for normal maintenance, loading, unloading, or logistics movement. Training weapons or weapon system simulators will be used for inspections when WR assets are not available, when WR weapons are specifically forbidden by Weapon System Safety Rules, DoD, CJCS, or MAJCOM directives, or when reinspection is required following unit decertification. In cases where training weapons or weapon system simulators are used for inspection purposes, they will be treated as WR while under evaluation.

3.1.5. Include in the NSI report all deficiencies that directly affect the safety, security, or reliability of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system.

3.2. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). The INSI is designed to evaluate a unit's readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission, to evaluate and certify new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities, or to evaluate a unit's readiness following significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof (see Attachment 2). Use training weapons to conduct an INSI before WR weapons are placed at the unit or facility. In coordination with AFSC/SEW, MAJCOMs will determine if an INSI is required. An INSI will be rated "Ready" or "Not Ready."

3.2.1. The inspection team evaluates a unit's capability to safely and reliably receive, store, transport, secure, maintain, load, mate, and render safe nuclear weapons or reentry systems. Aircrews and missile launch crews must demonstrate their knowledge of weapon acceptance procedures, nuclear weapon system safety rules, and nuclear weapon control order handling and authentication procedures. The inspection team also examines plans and resources for implementing an advanced readiness posture.

3.2.2. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and nuclear logistics airlift units must receive an INSI "Ready" rating before being considered capable of supporting a nuclear mission.

3.2.3. Phased INSIs may be conducted for large-scale, time-consuming efforts. If phased INSIs are conducted, the responsible MAJCOM prepares an inspection plan to make sure all required areas are initially inspected and sends it to HQ AFSC/SEW for approval. A “Ready” rating must be achieved for the phase of the INSI under evaluation before evaluating the next phase. All phases must be rated “Ready” prior to assuming nuclear operations. If a phased INSI is conducted and each phase is rated “Ready”, the required maximum 18-month period between NSIs starts on the completion date of the first phase.

3.3. Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI). The NSI is designed to evaluate a unit's capability to manage nuclear resources while complying with all nuclear surety standards (see applicable areas listed in paragraph 3.5.2.). An NSI may be combined with other MAJCOM inspections to reduce the number of unit inspections. Where two or more MAJCOMs share nuclear surety responsibilities at one base, Multi-MAJCOM NSIs (MMNSI) are encouraged to ensure host-tenant responsibilities are fully assessed and properly integrated. Either the host or tenant MAJCOM may perform these inspections with the concurrence of, and augmentation from, the other MAJCOM.

3.3.1. Frequency of MAJCOM NSIs.

3.3.1.1. Conduct an NSI of each nuclear-capable unit at least every 18 months. Complete all inspection requirements within 18 months after completing the last NSI. Complete all phases within a 120-calendar-day period. Provide the NSI rating when all phases are completed.

3.3.1.1.1. If a unit does not meet the 18-month inspection requirement and is not granted a waiver, they will be decertified. MAJCOM commanders will ensure nuclear weapons are maintained in a safe, secure, and reliable environment until the unit is recertified. Recertification will be accomplished by conducting an INSI.

3.3.1.1.2. Units may be selected at the discretion of the MAJCOM IG to receive a minimum-notice inspection that will key on a unit's ability to perform its nuclear mission. Notice will be sent by message to units with information copies to SAF/IGI, HQ AFSC/SEW, HQ USAF/SEI, and HQ USAF/XON.

3.3.1.2. Conduct a follow-up NSI 90 to 180 calendar days after a new unit successfully completes an INSI and receives nuclear weapons. EOD teams, nuclear airlift units, and certification of new or modified facilities do not require this follow-up NSI.

3.4. Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI). The LNSI is limited in scope and does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. It is conducted for a variety of reasons and does not alter the 18-month NSI requirement.

3.4.1. MAJCOMs conduct LNSIs to:

3.4.1.1. Inspect one or more areas designated by the MAJCOM CC or IG.

3.4.1.2. Reinspect a unit in any area that was rated “Unsatisfactory” during an NSI.

3.4.1.3. Contingency Nuclear Mission Units. Certify a unit with a nuclear contingency mission before deployment IAW [Attachment 2](#).

3.5. Nuclear Inspection Criteria and Areas. Nuclear inspection criteria and areas are designed to address all functional areas or operations related to the unit's nuclear mission. During LNSIs and INSIs, selected areas may be inspected.

3.5.1. Pass/Fail Criteria. Consider carefully all NSI pass/fail criteria when assessing any deficiency (see T.O. 11N-25-1, Section 3).

3.5.1.1. Areas rated "Unsatisfactory" under pass/fail criteria may be reinspected prior to inspection team departure. If the area is not reinspected to at least a "Marginal" level, the inspected unit must discontinue that portion of the operation until reinspected or corrective measures are implemented and approved by the MAJCOM commander pending reinspection.

3.5.1.2. Inspection Deficiencies.

3.5.1.2.1. Critical Deficiency. Any deficiency resulting in an "Unsatisfactory" rating for the specific area and an overall unit "Unsatisfactory" rating as defined in T.O. 11N-25-1, Section 3.

3.5.1.2.2. Major Deficiency. A deficiency that requires immediate, answerable action by the unit or higher agency to prevent an unreliable weapon, or unsafe or insecure environment. The deficiency may cause a unit to be rated "Unsatisfactory" in one or more inspection areas not defined as critical under overall unit pass/fail criteria.

3.5.1.2.3. Recommended Improvement Area. Any deficiency that does not meet the definition for a critical or major deficiency.

3.5.1.3. Deficiency Categories. The two categories of deficiencies for reporting and scoring purposes will be referred to as Findings and Recommended Improvement Areas. Critical and Major Deficiencies will be identified as Findings. All other deficiencies will be categorized as Recommended Improvement Areas.

3.5.1.4. For AFSC/SEW data tracking purposes, all Critical and Major Deficiencies will be assigned a cause code in the inspection report. Only the primary contributing cause code will be assigned against the deficiency. Each cause code is listed as follows:

3.5.1.4.1. Oversight. Errors in leadership or supervision at any level.

3.5.1.4.2. Experience. Errors committed despite adequate training, oversight, and guidance.

3.5.1.4.3. Guidance. Inadequate, confusing, or specific written direction that is contradictory or prevents adequate accomplishment of the task.

3.5.1.4.4. Training. Individuals inadequately trained/prepared to accomplish the task.

3.5.1.4.5. Equipment. Support equipment unavailable, inadequate, or inoperable due to circumstances beyond the unit's control. (Problems within the unit's control would fall under one of the other areas).

3.5.1.4.6. Other. Isolated events involving deficient actions of individuals not attributable to any of the previous causes.

3.5.2. Nuclear Inspection Areas. An "Unsatisfactory" rating in one of the following areas does not automatically result in an overall unit rating of "Unsatisfactory" unless it violates the pass/fail criteria. To provide a single source of consolidated inspection guidance, this paragraph combines USAF inspection requirements with DoD guidance extracted from T.O. 11N-25-1. An annotation [USAF] is

included at the end of each subparagraph containing DoD guidance which has been amplified or modified to meet specific USAF requirements.

3.5.2.1. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION.

3.5.2.1.1. Management. Evaluate leadership, guidance, and attitude of unit commander and key supervisors. Determine whether deficiencies are the result of individual error or reflect management or supervisory shortcomings. [USAF]

3.5.2.1.2. Administration. Evaluate:

3.5.2.1.2.1. Required up-to-date directives and technical publications applicable to the scope of the NSI in accordance with this manual. A check shall be made to ensure that changes are being received and posted, and the unit is not in receipt of unauthorized publications pertaining to nuclear weapons.

3.5.2.1.2.2. Unit Standard Operating Procedures/Plans/Instructions implementing DoD and USAF requirements in the areas of security, safety, nuclear accident/incident response, non-violent disablement, emergency evacuation, supply support, and logistic movement, as required.

3.5.2.1.2.3. An organizational listing of personnel assigned nuclear weapons duties, including security forces. This listing will be used in conjunction with inspection of the unit to ensure that the unit can safely and securely carry out the assigned nuclear weapons mission.

3.5.2.1.2.4. The control and handling of classified plans, manuals, records, reports, and components directly associated with the scope of the NSI, to include verifiable control procedures (VCP) for permissive action link and other designated coding equipment.

3.5.2.1.2.5. Required records properly maintained and evidence of timely submission of reports pertaining to nuclear weapons.

3.5.2.1.2.6. Accountability and/or custody records, to include courier receipts, shipping documents and records of audit. Designation in writing of accountable and/or custodial officers and verifying officers. Stockpile reporting to include Weapon Status Reports (WSRs), Semi-annual Inventory Reports (SIRs), etc.

3.5.2.1.2.7. Existing host-tenant agreements to determine their adequacy and to ensure they support the efficient execution of the unit's nuclear weapons mission, including the Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS) liaison officer. [USAF]

3.5.2.1.2.8. Unit training to be based upon the performance of the unit in the areas of technical operations, storage, maintenance, safety, security, and logistic movement. If deficiencies exist, a detailed inspection may be made to determine the extent to which training contributes to the deficiency(ies). This inspection point shall not be construed as a requirement for the generation of records not already required by pertinent Service or major command regulations.

3.5.2.1.2.9. Key and Lock Control to include designation in writing, key inventory, audit and transfer procedures, maintenance, and disposition.

3.5.2.1.2.10. Status of approved waivers, exemptions, deviations, and exceptions. [USAF]

3.5.2.1.2.11. Loading and management to include loading standardization, certification, training programs and schedules, adequacy of maintenance plans, and, for certain non-US delivery aircraft, status, certification procedures and records. [USAF]

3.5.2.1.2.12. Reentry system mating management to include standardization, training and certification programs, and maintenance plans as required. [USAF]

3.5.2.2. TECHNICAL OPERATIONS. Evaluate each type of assigned weapon to assess safety, reliability and technical performance.

3.5.2.2.1. The unit or activity shall be prepared to demonstrate each technical operation required to accomplish its nuclear weapons mission. Table 2-3 of T.O. 11N-25-1 lists areas subject to inspection during the technical operations portions of NSIs and shall be used by NSI teams to ensure sufficient functional area coverage of technical operations and the readiness of war reserve nuclear weapons. A limited number of operations specified in Table 2-3 may be omitted at the discretion of the team chief or chief inspector when essential; for example, due to operational requirements, area or facility limitations, or other managerial considerations. When units are unable to demonstrate areas to be inspected and operational commitments afford the opportunity, the unit to be inspected shall notify the inspecting organization of the problem or problems through the USAF organization responsible for scheduling the inspection. This notification will be made as soon as the problem is known to permit rescheduling of the inspection if necessary. A notation of the omission or omissions will be included in the inspection report.

3.5.2.2.2. Units having a multiple weapon capability may not be required to demonstrate a complete operation for each area listed in the tables if some of the operations are comparable.

3.5.2.2.3. If training weapons are used, operations must be performed in a safe and secure environment in the same manner as on war reserve weapons. Because of differences between some war reserve weapons and corresponding training items, units using training weapons during NSIs often must perform procedures not required with war reserve weapons. Inspectors must ensure deficiencies noted during the operations with training items would have occurred if the unit had been working with war reserve weapons. When a trainer is simulated to be war reserve, for the purpose of the inspection, it is war reserve. If the trainer does not meet war reserve standards and in fact is in reject condition, the inspected team shall so identify it; the inspector may then simulate that the deficiency has been corrected and the inspection may continue.

3.5.2.2.4. The operations shall be clearly divided between those conducted under peacetime conditions and those conducted under wartime conditions, and shall be organized so there will be no confusion on the part of the inspected unit when the transition from one phase to the other occurs.

3.5.2.2.5. Certain operations listed individually in Table 2-3 of T.O. 11N-25-1 may be combined with or be an integral part of other operations. For example, receipt inspections or verification inspections do not always require starting from or ending with a specific configuration. Inspectors approve the starting/ending configuration before the task starts.

3.5.2.2.6. Loading and Mating. Evaluate:

3.5.2.2.6.1. Ability to safely and reliably load aircraft, to include loading and mating, weapons transfer, upload operations, post upload procedures, trailer to weapons mate (if certified) and single weapon exchange. [USAF]

3.5.2.2.6.2. Weapon release system. For custodial units supporting non-US delivery organizations, include the US technical load monitor activity. [USAF]

3.5.2.2.7. Reentry System Mating in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Units. Evaluate team adherence to technical data and overall safety and reliability of each assigned weapon system type. [USAF]

3.5.2.3. TOOLS, TEST, TIEDOWN AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT. Tools, test, tiedown, and handling equipment shall be inspected for adequacy, condition, nuclear certification, proper marking, calibration status, and load test, as applicable. [USAF]

3.5.2.4. STORAGE AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AND CONDITIONS OF STOCK-PILE. The following areas will be inspected.

3.5.2.4.1. Examine at least 50% of the assets in igloo storage and a minimum of 25% of assets in weapon storage vaults and depots. Conduct spot inspections of weapons coded for retirement to ensure they are stored in a safe condition and are properly identified as being retired assets. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.2. Weapons, Components, and Ancillary Equipment out of Containers. Inspection shall consist of questioning personnel and examining items in storage. Items shall not be moved or disassembled for the inspection except to the extent allowed for authorized maintenance.

3.5.2.4.3. Weapons, Components, and Ancillary Equipment in Containers. Containers shall not be opened for the purpose of the inspection; however, when the state of maintenance of items or the condition or accuracy of records is suspect, the container shall be opened and a visual inspection of the item and records made. The determination to open containers shall be made by the team chief/senior technical inspector. The opening and resealing of containers must be within the inspected unit's capability or assistance must be requested from a support unit that has the capability. All seals shall be properly replaced if containers are opened. Condition and marking of containers shall be inspected whether or not they are opened.

3.5.2.4.4. Weapons stored in a weapon storage and security system. The vault shall be opened to allow a full inspection of the weapons.

3.5.2.4.5. Records associated with weapons, components, and ancillary equipment maintained by the inspected unit.

3.5.2.4.6. Compatibility of items stored or maintained.

3.5.2.4.7. Observance of explosives and active material limits of items during storage, maintenance, and transportation. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.8. Adequacy of interior lighting.

3.5.2.4.9. Adequacy of storage and maintenance structures.

3.5.2.4.10. Condition of storage and maintenance structures and loading or launch facilities. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.11. Roads in storage areas and between storage and loading or missile launch areas. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.12. Ground support equipment. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.13. Communications-computer systems. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.14. Utilities. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.15. Number and type of safety and explosive exceptions, waivers/deviations approved, and actions taken to eliminate conditions requiring exceptions or waivers/deviations.

3.5.2.4.16. Nuclear certified hoists that are an integral part of the facility. Critical deficiencies include using lifting, handling, or tiedown equipment which is unserviceable, unauthorized, or has not received mandatory load testing or safety related inspections. [USAF]

3.5.2.4.17. Lightning protection system, records, and demonstration of required system tests.

3.5.2.5. SECURITY. The inspection shall be conducted to ensure that required security/custody standards for protecting nuclear weapons are met. The following areas shall be examined for adequacy and compliance with applicable DOD, Joint, Air Force, and MAJCOM directives. [USAF]

3.5.2.5.1. Physical Security.

3.5.2.5.1.1. Physical security barriers/facilities.

3.5.2.5.1.2. Protective lighting.

3.5.2.5.1.3. Intrusion detection alarm systems.

3.5.2.5.1.4. Clear zones, to include adequacy with respect to vegetation and terrain features.

3.5.2.5.1.5. Key and lock control and use.

3.5.2.5.1.6. Military working dog teams as applicable. [USAF]

3.5.2.5.1.7. Guard (security forces and security augmentees) communications. [USAF]

3.5.2.5.1.8. Warning signs (multilingual, as appropriate).

3.5.2.5.1.9. Emergency power source and procedures.

3.5.2.5.1.10. Number and type of security deviations, adequacy of actions taken as compensatory measures, and actions taken to eliminate conditions requiring deviations.

3.5.2.5.2. Entry control procedures.

3.5.2.5.2.1. Entry control rosters.

3.5.2.5.2.2. Controlled badge system, as applicable.

3.5.2.5.2.3. Escort procedures.

3.5.2.5.2.4. Duress systems.

3.5.2.5.2.5. Two-Person Concept rule application.

3.5.2.5.2.6. Package, material, and vehicle control.

- 3.5.2.5.3. Performance of Security Personnel.
 - 3.5.2.5.3.1. Knowledge of required actions.
 - 3.5.2.5.3.2. Quality of performance of required actions.
 - 3.5.2.5.3.3. Personnel properly equipped.
 - 3.5.2.5.3.4. Emergencies; use scenarios to judge the effectiveness of security force reactions to emergencies and base level response to terrorist attack, including response force arrival to nuclear areas. [USAF]
- 3.5.2.5.4. Plans/Instructions and Procedures.
 - 3.5.2.5.4.1. Physical Security Plan/Instruction.
 - 3.5.2.5.4.2. Guard (security forces and security augmentees) orders. [USAF]
 - 3.5.2.5.4.3. Standard Operating Procedures/Implementing Instructions.
- 3.5.2.5.5. Motor Vehicle Convoy Activities. [USAF]
 - 3.5.2.5.5.1. Custodial/guard personal equipment and communications, guard orders, guard knowledge, and deployment of guard force.
 - 3.5.2.5.5.2. Required number of vehicles, vehicle communications, and vehicle spacing, to include quantity-distance, safety, and security considerations.
- 3.5.2.6. SAFETY. The inspection shall be conducted to ensure the adequacy of the following:
 - 3.5.2.6.1. Compliance with the Two-Person Concept.
 - 3.5.2.6.2. Compliance with safety requirements/precautions specified in pertinent directives in the areas of weapons handling, assembly, maintenance, storage operations, logistic movements, explosive safety standards, explosives and active material limits, and weapons system safety rules. [USAF]
 - 3.5.2.6.3. Nuclear Surety Program. Evaluate compliance, programs, and management per AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*. [USAF]
 - 3.5.2.6.4. General safety practices. [USAF]
 - 3.5.2.6.5. Unit fire prevention program, practices, procedures, and the overall implementation thereof.
- 3.5.2.7. SUPPLY SUPPORT. The following shall be inspected only as they pertain to nuclear weapons, DOE-furnished components, and items required for maintenance, storage, and handling thereof.
 - 3.5.2.7.1. The status of nuclear weapons associated equipment and authorized repair parts.
 - 3.5.2.7.2. The adequacy of replacement procedures (requisitions and follow-up action).
 - 3.5.2.7.3. The status of authorized and required items of equipment as reflected in the nuclear weapons allowance list/authorized stockage list.
 - 3.5.2.7.4. The supply management of nuclear ordnance; WR major assemblies; and related nuclear weapon material for positive accounting, custodial control, and status reporting. [USAF]

3.5.2.8. PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM. Inspection will consist of a review of applicable records and questioning of personnel to ensure unit compliance with applicable DOD directives as implemented by USAF directives. Examine the following:

3.5.2.8.1. Procedures to include PRP screening, certification and decertification.

3.5.2.8.2. Appropriate documentation in medical and personnel records.

3.5.2.8.3. Investigative and security clearance requirements and documentation.

3.5.2.8.4. Knowledge and awareness of the reliability program by personnel in the program.

3.5.2.8.5. Overall effectiveness of the unit's implementation of the program to ensure no unqualified person is certified; non-certified individuals are prevented from performing tasks requiring certification; and commanders are kept informed of potentially disqualifying information. [USAF]

3.5.2.8.6. Evaluate units for spirit and intent as well as compliance. [USAF]

3.5.2.9. LOGISTICS MOVEMENT. All units supporting or having responsibility for logistic movement of nuclear weapons are subject to NSIs.

3.5.2.9.1. Applicability. For an organization whose sole nuclear weapons responsibility is the transportation of nuclear weapons, only that capability is subject to inspection. For an organization whose sole nuclear weapons responsibility is in the area of providing support (direct or indirect), only those support functions are subject to inspection, and only insofar as they pertain to the execution of nuclear weapons logistic movement during the inspection of a supported unit. For an organization whose logistic movement capability is an inherent part of its overall nuclear capability, the logistic movement functions shall be inspected in conjunction with the NSI of the unit's overall nuclear capability. The following are general categories of logistic movements subject to NSIs and examples of support organizations that may become involved in each category:

3.5.2.9.1.1. Military airlift operations. Air Mobility Command (AMC) and United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). [USAF]

3.5.2.9.1.2. Convoy operations. Includes operational movements to or from launch facilities and weapon movement activities. Logistics airlift units must demonstrate the ability to safely and properly load, transport, unload, and transfer custody of weapons. For ICBM units, the capability to transfer/transport, load/unload, tie-down and transfer custody of weapons for safe, secure trailer missions may be evaluated as a logistics movement. [USAF]

3.5.2.9.2. Scope. All organizations supporting or having responsibility for logistic movement of nuclear weapons shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas, as applicable, insofar as it pertains to logistic movement and is included in the inspected unit's mission:

3.5.2.9.2.1. Security (see paragraph [3.5.2.5](#)).

3.5.2.9.2.2. Safety (see paragraph [3.5.2.6](#)).

3.5.2.9.2.3. Qualification and certification of transport, handling, and courier personnel.

3.5.2.9.2.4. Equipment for adequacy, condition, maintenance, calibration, and certification.

3.5.2.9.2.5. Unit Standard Operating Procedures/Plans/Instructions implementing DOD and USAF requirements in the areas of security, safety, nuclear accident/incident response, non-violent disablement, emergency evacuation, supply support, and logistic movement, as required. [USAF]

3.5.2.9.2.6. Nuclear weapons custody and accountability procedures.

3.5.2.9.2.7. Verification of integrity of seals or certification of physical verification.

3.5.2.9.2.8. Implementation of the Personnel Reliability Program (see paragraph 3.5.2.8.).

3.5.2.9.2.9. Courier personnel briefings and required documentation and instructions.

3.5.2.9.2.10. Procedures for notification of shipment to enroute stops, destination(s), and consignees.

3.5.2.9.2.11. Nuclear weapon system handling procedures.

3.5.2.9.2.12. Security personnel briefing.

3.5.2.9.3. Units directly involved with military airlift operations shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas:

3.5.2.9.3.1. Point of Origin Procedures.

3.5.2.9.3.1.1. Briefings (mission, predeparture, Special Weapons Overflight Guide, and shipping).

3.5.2.9.3.1.2. Acquisition and positioning of opportune cargo.

3.5.2.9.3.1.3. Loading and tiedown procedures.

3.5.2.9.3.2. Enroute Procedures, as applicable.

3.5.2.9.3.2.1. Weather minimums.

3.5.2.9.3.2.2. Minimum essential navigational aids and communications equipment.

3.5.2.9.3.2.3. Emergency and routine enroute stops.

3.5.2.9.3.2.4. Jettisoning.

3.5.2.9.3.2.5. Non-violent disablement procedures.

3.5.2.9.3.2.6. Handling of opportune cargo.

3.5.2.9.3.2.7. Customs.

3.5.2.9.3.3. Destination or Offload Point Procedures, as applicable.

3.5.2.9.3.3.1. Briefings.

3.5.2.9.3.3.2. Offloading.

3.5.2.9.3.3.3. Flight planning (if the carrier is to proceed with nuclear weapons cargo).

3.5.2.9.3.3.4. Customs.

3.5.2.9.3.3.5. Opportune cargo.

3.5.2.9.4. Units directly involved with motor vehicle operations shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas:

3.5.2.9.4.1. Transfer of cargo, to include precautions against hazards.

3.5.2.9.4.2. Provision of area security when required at origin, enroute, and at destination.

3.5.2.9.4.3. Use of tiedown equipment, safety chains, and security covers, as applicable.

3.5.2.9.4.4. Application of quantity-distance requirements.

3.5.2.9.4.5. Use of warning signs or devices.

3.5.2.9.4.6. Convoy operations, to include communication equipment and procedures.

3.5.2.9.4.7. Non-violent disablement procedures, as applicable.

3.5.2.9.5. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Support. Evaluate PNAF support plans, security support, and logistics movement (see AFJI 11-204, AFI 11-299) for PNAF certified units and installations supporting nuclear airlift missions. [USAF]

3.5.2.10. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD). Evaluate classroom and practical training program, condition of facilities and vehicles, availability, serviceability, and demonstrated use of nuclear support equipment, maintenance of technical orders, operating instructions, Team Chief Guides, AF Form 55, *Employee Safety and Health Record*, AF Form 623, *Individual Training Record*, and other related publications, initial and annual certification and decertification documentation if required, knowledge of hazardous and classified weapons components, and render safe procedures (RSP), and continuation of RSP. [USAF]

3.5.2.11. NUCLEAR CONTROL ORDER PROCEDURES. Evaluate command post, aircrew, and missile crew responses to nuclear control orders. [USAF]

3.5.2.12. EMERGENCY EVACUATION, DENIAL AND COMMAND DISABLEMENT. Evaluate Emergency Evacuation, Denial, and Command Disablement. [USAF]

3.5.2.13. USE CONTROL. Evaluate Permissive Action Link, Command Disablement System, and Active Protection System operations. [USAF]

3.6. Nuclear Inspection Rating System. Assign ratings of “Satisfactory”, “Satisfactory (Support Unsatisfactory)” (for deficiencies attributed to outside agencies or higher headquarters), or “Unsatisfactory” for the overall inspection. Base the final rating on the nature, severity, and number of findings noted during the inspection. Use the 5 level rating system for each applicable evaluated area. For phased NSIs and LNSIs, an overall rating will be assigned upon completing the inspection. Assign “Ready” or “Not Ready” ratings for INSIs.

3.7. Reinspection of Deficient Areas. MAJCOMs use the following guidance to determine reinspection policy:

3.7.1. If the overall inspection rating is “Unsatisfactory”, reinspect the deficient areas that caused or contributed to an “Unsatisfactory” rating.

3.7.1.1. Conduct a reinspection (NSI or LNSI) within 90 calendar days for units rated “Unsatisfactory” that do not achieve an overall “Satisfactory” rating on an on-the-spot reinspection.

3.7.2. Before terminating the inspection, the team chief may conduct an on-the-spot reinspection of the deficient areas that caused or contributed to an “Unsatisfactory” rating. If a reinspection is conducted, the message report and the formal report must reflect both the original and reinspection ratings for the overall grade and the deficient areas that caused or contributed to an “Unsatisfactory” rating. An immediate reinspection that yields a minimum rating of “Marginal” in the previously deficient area indicates that the deficiency is sufficiently corrected to permit operations, and a 90-calendar-day follow-up inspection is not required. The following apply when determining if an on-the-spot reinspection is appropriate:

3.7.2.1. Do not reinspect if the failure is due to a systemic problem or a general lack of proficiency within the unit.

3.7.2.2. Do not reinspect if suspension of nuclear weapon operations is in the best interest of nuclear safety, security, or reliability.

3.7.2.3. Reinspect if the “Unsatisfactory” rating was caused by an individual's error and training was adequate.

3.7.2.4. Consider reinspection if the “Unsatisfactory” rating was caused by an administrative error that can be resolved quickly and easily; for example, improper guidance or procedure in a unit instruction, operations plan, or operations order.

3.7.3. For a unit rated “Unsatisfactory” that does not achieve a “Satisfactory” on a reinspection, the MAJCOM commander must approve the unit's use of nuclear weapons. MAJCOMs ensure nuclear weapons are maintained reliably and afforded a safe and secure environment until restrictions are removed by a reinspection.

3.8. Actions on Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Inspection Reports.

3.8.1. Units coordinate replies to Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI), Joint Nuclear Surety Inspection (JNSI), and Surveillance Inspection (SI) reports through the appropriate MAJCOM functional manager. Critical/major deficiencies require a description of the unit's corrective action. All other deficiencies simply require a statement that the corrective action is completed. The MAJCOM CARS program monitor will coordinate the MAJCOM response and forward to the AFSC/SEW. An initial response is required 90 days after the date of the final report. If the report is not closed within 180 days of the date of the final report, the MAJCOM CARS program monitor will provide an update every thirty days on open deficiencies until the report is closed. Take corrective action based on the field report provided by the DTRA team at the time of the inspection.

3.8.1.1. If all deficiencies are corrected within 12 months of the final report, provide a letter from the MAJCOM/CV designated representative that the MAJCOM concurs with all corrective actions and requests closure of the DTRA inspection report. If all deficiencies are not corrected within 12 months, provide the closure request letter directly from the MAJCOM CV.

3.8.2. With an overall “Unsatisfactory” DNSI/JNSI rating, the MAJCOM must evaluate the results and the unit's status to determine if the procedures of paragraph 3.5.1.1 should be invoked. The MAJCOM must notify HQ AFSC/SEW of the evaluation results within 24 hours (by priority message) after the DTRA inspection is completed.

3.9. Nuclear Inspection Reports. Provide the results of NSIs in message and formal report formats. Include a paragraph reference from the applicable DoD or Air Force instruction or technical order for all deficiencies cited. LNSIs and INSIs are normally reported only by message.

3.9.1. Message Report (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0006). Inspection teams report the results of an NSI, LNSI, and INSI in the format shown in [Attachment 3](#) and [Attachment 4](#). Do not combine NSI, LNSI, and INSI message reports with other inspection message reports.

3.9.1.1. Use priority precedence when reporting “Unsatisfactory” (NSI and LNSI) or “Not Ready” (INSI) ratings. Even during MINIMIZE, submit an inspection message if the unit is found “Not Ready”, “Unsatisfactory”, or has critical/major deficiencies. Include a description of all critical/major deficiencies (see [Attachment 3](#) and [Attachment 4](#)).

3.9.2. Extract Message Report (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0007). Inspecting team extracts LIMFACs and critical/major deficiencies that are the responsibility of a support activity outside the MAJCOM. Send an Extract Message Report (see [Attachment 4](#)) as follows:

3.9.2.1. An action copy to the responsible MAJCOM IG and applicable staff agency.

3.9.2.2. Information copies to the responsible organization, its intermediate headquarters, and basic report addressees.

3.9.3. Procedural Responsibility. MAJCOMs establish procedures for processing, tracking, and correcting identified critical/major deficiencies. Deficiencies that are corrected before the inspection is completed do not require processing.

3.9.4. Formal NSI Report (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0005). The MAJCOM inspection team will:

3.9.4.1. If the formal NSI report will be prepared after the inspection team departs, provide the unit commander enough information to allow corrective action to be taken. List all deficiencies under one of the 13 areas in paragraph [3.5.2](#). Deficiencies identified against a Higher Headquarters or other support agency should be put in a separate section (e.g., Tab B) unless the unit shares some of the responsibility for the deficiency.

3.9.4.2. Prepare the formal NSI report according to MAJCOM directives. If applicable, send the entire report, or those parts that report on the supporting unit's functions, to the MAJCOM that provided support. In addition to addressees specified by the MAJCOM, send copies of this report to the following:

HQ USAF/SEI	1400 Air Force Pentagon	Washington, DC 20330-1400
HQ USAF/XOF	1340 Air Force Pentagon	Washington, DC 20330-1340
HQ USAF/XON	1480 Air Force Pentagon	Washington, DC 20330-1480
SAF/IGI	1140 Air Force Pentagon	Washington, DC 20330-1140
HQ AFPC/DPSFM	550 C St West Suite 37	Randolph AFB, TX 78150
HQ AFSC/SEW	9700 Ave G SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670
NCCS Support Staff	5201 Leesburg Pike Suite 500	Falls Church, VA 22041-3202
DTRA/NSII	1680 Texas St SE	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669
2 BW/CC	841 Fairchild Ave Suite 100	Barksdale AFB, LA 71110-2270

4 FW/CC	1510 Wright Ave Suite 100	Seymour Johnson AFB, NC 27531-2468
5 BW/CC	201 Summit Dr Suite 1	Minot AFB, ND 58705-5037
31 FW/CC	Unit 6140 Box 100	APO AE 09604-0100
39 WG/CC	Unit 7090 Box 110	APO AE 09824-0110
48 FW/CC	Unit 5210 Box 135	APO AE 09464-0135
62 AW/CC	100 Main St	McChord AFB, WA 98438-5000
86 AW/CC	Unit 3200 Box 320	APO AE 09094-0320
90 SW/CC	5305 Randall Ave Suite 100	F.E. Warren AFB, WY 82005-2266
91 SW/CC	300 Minuteman Dr, Suite 101	Minot AFB, ND 58705-5016
99 ABW/CC	4430 Grissom Ave Suite 110	Nellis AFB, NV 89191-6520
305 AMW/CC	2901 Falcon Lane	McGuire AFB, NJ 08641-5002
341 SW/CC	21 77 th St North Room 144	Malmstrom AFB, MT 59402-7538
509 BW/CC	509 Spirit Blvd Suite 509	Whiteman AFB, MO 65305-5055
31 MUNSS/CC	Unit 6345	APO AE 09610
52 MUNSS/CC	Unit 21903	APO AE 09713-6705
731 MUNSS/CC	Unit 6345	APO AE 09610-6345
752 MUNSS/CC	Unit 6790	APO AE 09717-6790
852 MUNSS/CC	Unit 4565	APO AE 09214-4565
896 MUNSS/CC	8230 Bergstrom Ave	Nellis AFB, NV 89191-6110
898 MUNSS/CC	7500 Prairie Rd Bldg 27494	Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-6520

Chapter 4

AIR FORCE INSPECTION AGENCY (AFIA) INSPECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

4.1. Eagle Look Management Reviews . An Eagle Look is an independent and objective management review of key Air Force-wide processes requested by senior leadership. Each Eagle Look culminates with a written report and executive briefing which includes recommendations, results, and follow-up intended to improve operations, support, and acquisition functions.

4.1.1. Topic Sponsors. Eagle Look topics are provided and sponsored by the Secretariat, HQ USAF Deputy Chiefs of Staff, MAJCOMs and other Air Force senior leadership. SAF/IG may sponsor a topic independently.

4.1.2. Topic Selection and Approval. Air Force personnel may forward proposed topics, including background and rationale. Secretariat and HQ USAF offices forward topics directly to AFIA/CC. MAJCOMs, FOAs, and DRUs forward topics that cross MAJCOM lines or apply Air Force-wide to AFIA/CC, who will ensure proposed topics/studies are not redundant. AFIA/CC and SAF/IGI will coordinate with DoD/IG, Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA), and other oversight agencies as applicable. SAF/IG approves the topics. Topics related to readiness issues will take priority over other topics. Submit Eagle Look topic proposals IAW [Attachment 8](#).

4.1.3. Report Follow-up. Program deficiencies are identified in Eagle Look findings. Follow up is conducted based on mutual agreement between AFIA and the Air Staff/MAJCOM process owner. The goal of follow up is to ensure positive change for the Air Force. Specific items may be identified by AFIA or SAF/IG as requiring a response from the OPR to AFIA identifying corrective actions taken. Topic sponsors may request additional follow-up, review, or further inspection. SAF/IG may direct follow-up on any issues identified in management reviews or field inspections.

4.2. Compliance Inspection (CI). AFIA conducts compliance inspections of Air Force-level Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) on compliance inspection items (CIIs) listed in [Attachment 6](#) as a minimum, and any other areas mutually agreed to by AFIA and the DRU/FOA commander.

4.3. Health Services Inspection (HSI). An HSI is an assessment of the ability of Air Force medical units to fulfill their peacetime and wartime missions, including an evaluation of medical care and the effectiveness and efficiency of medical management.

4.3.1. Criteria and Inspection Guides. HQ AFIA/SG derives criteria from health care policies of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD(HA)), the office of the Air Force Surgeon General (HQ USAF/SG), various civilian medical oversight agencies (such as the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), the ANG, and the AFRC. AFIA/SG updates and distributes inspection guides to assist inspectors and medical units.

4.3.2. Ratings. HQ AFIA/SG rates Air Force medical units on leadership and management, health care delivery, resources, and readiness.

4.3.3. Inspection Frequency. The following guidelines are used for planning purposes.

4.3.3.1. Active duty medical treatment facilities are inspected approximately every 3 years.

4.3.3.2. ARC units are inspected approximately every 4 years.

4.3.3.3. Inspection Scheduling. Active duty units enter an HSI scheduling window 12 months after their last HSI. ARC units enter an HSI scheduling window 36 months following their last HSI. HSIs may be conducted on a scheduled or short notice basis (except for ARC units which will receive approximately one year notice).

4.3.3.3.1. Guidance for requesting exceptions to HSI scheduling policy may be found in the Health Services Inspection Guide.

4.3.3.4. Follow-up inspections. Units receiving an overall rating of less than “Satisfactory” (or equivalent rating) during an HSI will be scheduled for a follow-up inspection using the following guidelines.

4.3.3.4.1. Active duty units should receive a MAJCOM staff assistance visit (SAV) to review all Type 1 and Type 2 findings within 6 months of the original HSI.

4.3.3.4.2. For ARC units, the MAJCOM/SG, or equivalent, will certify to AFIA within one year that the identified discrepancies have been corrected.

4.3.4. Reports and Follow-up Responses. A clearly annotated “DRAFT” HSI report will be published and left with the unit commander at the conclusion of the inspection. Approximately 45 days after completion of the HSI, a final report will be published, sent to the unit and wing commander, and distributed to other interested staff agencies.

4.3.4.1. Type 1 findings require a response (close-out or interim update) within 3 months of the inspection for active duty units and within 6 months of the inspection for ARC units. Type 1 findings are expected to be completely resolved within 6 months for active duty units and 12 months for ARC units. Responses should be forwarded to HQ AFIA/SG IAW the instructions outlined in the HSI final report.

4.4. Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Oversight. The purpose of AE medical oversight is to assess an aeromedical evacuation unit’s ability to fulfill predetermined aspects of its peacetime and wartime missions.

4.4.1. Criteria. HQ AFIA/SG, in coordination with the MAJCOMs, develops criteria used to assess indicators from the health care policies of the OASD(HA), AF/SG, civilian medical oversight agencies (such as JCAHO), ANG, and AFRC.

4.5. Field Inspection. As applicable, these inspections provide SAF/IG credible, independent assessments of Air Force operational readiness, efficiency, discipline, morale, economy, and effectiveness, as well as assist in oversight of the Air Force inspection system.

4.5.1. IG Team Augmentation. On request, AFIA inspectors may augment MAJCOM IG teams during inspections of field units. AFIA augmentees do not write a separate report. Rated inspectors with current medical and physiological training prerequisites may fly as observers in unit aircraft when appropriate to their inspection role.

4.5.2. Contingencies and Combat. AFIA inspectors may deploy to forward locations and field headquarters during contingency and/or combat operations to observe processes and recommend solutions to readiness problems beyond the control of the local Air Force field commander. These visits require approval by the appropriate unified command. This is not an inspection, but is an opportunity for an

independent and impartial Air Force-level team to analyze systemic readiness problems that may need HQ USAF or higher level attention. Refer also to War Mobilization Plan, Volume 1, Annex O.

4.6. Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI). An IGDI is a high-priority investigation directed by the Inspector General. These investigations are usually time sensitive and findings and recommendations are of significant interest to the Air Force, members of Congress, or the general public. The Inspector General approves all requests for IGDI.

4.7. Air Force Inspectors Course. AFIA is responsible for the content and conduct of the Air Force Inspectors Course to provide training to Air Force personnel as required. MAJCOM IG inspectors are the primary target audience.

4.8. TIG Brief Magazine . AFIA publishes *TIG Brief* (AFRP 90-1) which provides authoritative guidance and information to commanders, inspectors general, inspectors, and Air Force supervisors and leaders at all levels of command. Anyone may submit articles to AFIA public affairs. Articles should relate anticipated or actual problems, recommendations to improve management, safety, security, inspection or operational techniques, crosstell of lessons learned, best practices, or contemporary issues of interest to the Air Force.

NICHOLAS B. KEHOE, Lt Gen, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

AFJI 11-204 *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Material*
AFI 11-299 *Nuclear Airlift Operations*
AFI 14-104 *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*
AFI 31-401 *Information Security Program Management*
AFMAN 36-2105 *Officer Classification*
AFMAN 37-139 *Records Disposition Schedule*
AFI 91-101 *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*
AFI 91-104 *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*
AFMAN 91-201 *Explosives Safety Standards*
AFI 91-202 *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*
AFI 91-204 *Safety Investigations and Reports*
AFPD 90-2 *Inspector General-The Inspection System*
AFRP 90-1 *TIG Brief*
DoDD 3150.2 *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*, December 1996
DoD 5200.1-R *DoD Information Security Program*, January 1997
DoD 5400.7-R/AFSUP 1 *DoD Freedom of Information Act Program*, July 1999
T.O. 11N-25-1 *DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*, March 2000

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFAA—Air Force Audit Agency
AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFIA—Air Force Inspection Agency
AFMIA—Air Force Manpower and Innovation Agency
AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive
AFSC—Air Force Safety Center
AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command
ANG—Air National Guard
ARC—Air Reserve Component
ATO—Air Tasking Order

CARS—Corrective Action Report Status

CCC—Common Core Criteria

CI—Compliance Inspection

CII—Compliance Inspection Item

CSAF—Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

CSAI—Contracted Support Activity Inspection

DCS—Deputy Chiefs of Staff

DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTRA AO—Defense Threat Reduction Agency Albuquerque Operations

DNSI—Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection

DOC—Designed Operational Capability

DoD—Department of Defense

DRU—Direct Reporting Unit

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FOA—Field Operating Agency

FOUO—For Official Use Only

HQ AFIA/AI—HQ AFIA, Acquisition Inspection Directorate

HQ AFIA/CC—HQ AFIA, Commander

HQ AFIA/FO—HQ AFIA, Field Operations Directorate

HQ AFIA/MS—HQ AFIA, Mission Support Directorate

HQ AFIA/SG—HQ AFIA, Medical Directorate

HQ AFSC—Headquarters Air Force Safety Center

HQ AFSC/SEW—HQ AFSC, Weapons, Space, Nuclear Safety Division

HQ USAF—Headquarters United States Air Force

HQ USAF/XOI—HQ USAF, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

HQ USAF/SE —HQ USAF, DCS Safety

HQ USAF/XO —HQ USAF, DCS, Air and Space Operations

HSI—Health Services Inspection

IG—Inspector General

IGDI—Inspector General Directed Investigation

INSI—Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection

IO—Intelligence Oversight

JNSI—Joint Nuclear Surety Inspection
LIMFAC—Limiting Factor
LNSI—Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection
MAJCOM—Major Command
METL—Mission Essential Task List
MMNSI—Multi-MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Inspection
MUNSS—Munitions Support Squadron
NGB—National Guard Bureau
NMC—Not Mission Capable
NSI—Nuclear Surety Inspection
NORI—Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection
OPLAN—Operation Plan
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC—Operations Security
ORI—Operational Readiness Inspection
OSD—Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSHA—Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PNAF—Prime Nuclear Airlift Force
PRP—Personnel Reliability Program
SAF—Secretary of the Air Force
SAF/GC—SAF, General Counsel
SAF/IG—SAF, Inspector General
SAF/IGI—SAF/IG, Director of Inspections
SECAF—Secretary of the Air Force
SI—Surveillance Inspection
SII—Special Interest Item
WR—War Reserve

Terms

Assess —To appraise or evaluate. Independent evaluation of the efficiency or effectiveness of a policy, process, or outcome by an organization that did not develop the policy or process.

Access Deficiencies —Access occurs when an unauthorized individual or individuals has close proximity to a nuclear weapon, weapon system, or critical component in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage the weapon, system, or component. Consider these deficiencies

when evaluating all other areas.

Best Practice —A superior method or innovative practice that contributes significantly to improved performance of a process.

Combined Inspection —The combination of more than one type of inspection into one IG visit.

Common Core Criteria (CCC)—Criteria that establishes an Air Force-wide common standard for evaluation of like units or organizations.

Compliance Inspection Items (CII) —Those items requiring actions by US laws, Executive Orders, Department of Defense Directives, and safety, that if not complied with could result in significant legal liabilities, penalties, or mission impact. These items are outlined in Attachment 6 of this instruction, and applicable safety regulations.

Critical Deficiency —For NSIs, any deficiency resulting in an “Unsatisfactory” rating as defined in T.O. 11N-25-1, Section 3.

Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI)—A Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

Eagle Look —Independent and objective management review of key Air Force-wide processes requested by senior leadership.

Excellent —The grade given to indicate performance or operation exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and relatively free of deficiencies.

Finding —For NSIs, a Critical or Major Deficiency.

Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI) —A high priority investigation directed by The Inspector General.

Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) —An inspection to evaluate a unit’s readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission or to evaluate and certify new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities or significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof.

Limiting Factor (LIMFAC) —A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc.

Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI)—A limited scope inspection which does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. Conducted for a variety of reasons, it does not alter the 18-month NSI requirement.

Joint Nuclear Surety Inspection—A nuclear surety inspection conducted jointly by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and a MAJCOM IG Team. (Reference T.O. 11N-25-1)

Major Deficiency —Any deficiency that requires immediate, answerable action by the unit or higher agency to prevent an unreliable weapon, or unsafe or insecure environment. The deficiency may cause a unit to be rated “Unsatisfactory” in one or more inspection areas not defined as critical under overall unit pass/fail criteria.

Marginal —The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet some mission

requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and programs are not efficiently managed. Deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment.

Minimum Notice —Inspection notice given to a unit prior to the inspection; should be the minimum necessary for scheduling and practical preparation time.

Nuclear-Capable Unit —A wing, group, squadron, or other designated element that does not necessarily possess nuclear weapons but has a mission to receive, store, handle, test, maintain, transport, load and unload, mate and demate, stand alert, or perform strike missions with nuclear bombs or warheads. An Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team with a level of nuclear capability (full capability nuclear support) maintained by units that support nuclear weapon storage areas, one or more consolidated support bases storing these systems, or a location identified by Air Mobility Command (AMC) as a primary throughput or divert-location. US custodial units supporting non-US delivery organizations are nuclear-capable units.

Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI)—An inspection to evaluate a unit's capability to manage nuclear resources while complying with all nuclear surety standards.

Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) —An evaluation of operational readiness or ability to conduct combat operations in wartime for any unit with a wartime mission. The unit is evaluated on how well it can respond, employ forces, provide mission support, and survive and operate in a combat environment.

Outstanding —The grade given to indicate performance or operation far exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and are of exceptional merit. Minimal deficiencies exist.

Oversight —The watchful management or supervision of the implementation of policy performed by the agency responsible for development of that policy.

Readiness —The ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels:

- a. **Unit Readiness** The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.
- b. **Joint Readiness** The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his assigned missions.

Recommended Improvement Area—Any deficiency that does not meet the criteria for a critical or major deficiency.

Resource Availability —Includes personnel, equipment, or authorized repair parts. Failure results from shortages within the unit's control, preventing required nuclear weapon technical operations.

Satisfactory —The grade given to indicate performance or operation meets mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an effective and competent manner. Resources and programs are efficiently managed. Minor deficiencies may exist but do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

Special Interest Item (SII) —A tool to focus management attention, gather data, and assess the status of specific programs and conditions in the field. SIIs are evaluated by IG inspectors using inspection guides and grading criteria provided by the SII sponsoring agency.

Unsatisfactory —The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

Attachment 2

INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR NUCLEAR MISSION CHANGES

I T E M	A	B	C	D	E
	Type of change	Primary Unit Functions Affected	Type of Inspection	When Inspected	Remarks
1	Assuming or resuming nuclear mission or relocation of the unit.	All unit functions.	INSI	Before introducing weapons into the unit or resuming tasks.	INSI is required for units who do not meet the 18-month requirement (see Note 4).
2	Certifying new or significantly modified maintenance or storage facilities.	Appropriate inspection areas.	INSI	Before introducing weapons into the new or modified facility.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI. Evaluate design, construction, security policies, and procedures (see notes 1 and 2).
3	Activating new non-combat delivery squadron (PNAF).	Appropriate wing and squadron functions.	INSI	Before conducting any operations involving nuclear weapons.	When changing PNAF squadrons within a wing, wing agencies do not require reevaluation during the INSI if their support functions remain unchanged by the squadron conversion.
4	New weapon type.	Maintenance, loading, supply, and EOD.	INSI	Before receiving the first new weapon.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI.
5	New type of delivery system.	Loading or mating and EOD.	INSI	Before loading or mating to new delivery system.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI.
6	Certifying or recertifying a unit assigned a contingency nuclear mission.	Applicable functions and programs.	INSI or LNSI (see note 3)	Before conducting any operations involving nuclear weapons.	If the unit deploys and handles war reserve weapons during exercises, accomplish the inspection 90 calendar days before deployment.

NOTES:

1. An INSI may be conducted on one or more facilities that are typical of new construction at a base. If no other similar structures or facilities are modified after the INSI of typical structures, an inspection of other structures or facilities is not required. If new structures or facilities are located in a specific area (alert area or weapons storage area) and all of the area is affected, inspect the entire area after construction is completed.
2. An INSI of new or significantly modified security intrusion detection systems is required after satisfactory completion of the 30-day sensor test. Significant modifications include added, removed, or modified sensors that differ from original specifications or certification, change to source code on computer based intrusion detection systems, or installation of new software (this does not include upgrades to existing software that have been properly certified). MAJCOM IG or, when delegated, MAJCOM SF must certify the system for operational use.
3. An INSI is required if the unit is being certified for the first time for its contingency nuclear mission or if the 18-month certification is expired. An LNSI may be conducted (in lieu of an NSI) if the unit had an NSI within 18 months, but a subordinate unit requires certification. (**EXAMPLE:** A wing with two combat delivery squadrons tasked for a contingency nuclear capability receives an INSI, but only one of its two squadrons is certified. An LNSI may be accomplished if the second combat delivery squadron is subsequently tasked to demonstrate capability and the required certification inspection occurs within 18 months of the wing's last inspection. Under these circumstances, the MAJCOM inspection team must decide whether to accomplish an LNSI or NSI.)
4. An INSI is required if the unit has not had an NSI within the 18-month requirement unless a waiver was approved by AFSC/SE. The unit will be decertified and cease all nuclear critical tasks until the INSI is complete. The MAJCOM CC is responsible for insuring the safety and security of all Nuclear assets during the interim period between decertification and recertification.

Attachment 3**MESSAGE FORMAT FOR NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS**

FROM: (MAJCOM) IG TEAM (Base and Functional Address Symbol)

TO: (MAJCOM) (Base)//CC/(Appropriate Staff)//
(Numbered Air Force, if applicable) (Base)//CC//
(Wing, Group, or Squadron) (Base)//CC//

INFO: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//SEI/XOF/XON/ILMW//

HQ AFSC KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC/SEW//

HQ AFIA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC//

NCCS SUPPORT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//

OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IGI//

DTRA AO KIRTLAND AFB NM//NSSI//

(Security classification) - (FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
1954, if applicable) - PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT--REF AFI 90-201

(NOTE: Assign a classification according to message content; simply associating an INSI, NSI, or LNSI with specific units is normally unclassified. Refer to applicable classification guides for specific guidance.)

SUBJECT: INITIAL NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (INSI) REPORT

NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) REPORT

LIMITED NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (LNSI) REPORT

(Use appropriate subject.)

1. REFERENCE: (Include all applicable documents; e.g., for reinspections, refer to the message report and date of the previous inspection.)

2. INSPECTION AUTHORITY: THE (MAJCOM) IG TEAM CONDUCTED AN (INSI, NSI, or LNSI) OF THE (unit and base) ON (inclusive dates) ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201. THE INSPECTION TEAM CHIEF WAS (grade and name).

3. SYSTEMS INSPECTED AND AREAS OBSERVED: (Identify each weapon system, e.g., MK 12). THE TECHNICAL OPERATION OR OBSERVATIONS OBSERVED CORRESPOND TO AFI 90-201 AND THE (MAJCOM) SUPPLEMENT. (Indicate war reserve, e.g., -1A on B61 WR; or training unit, e.g., parachute exchange on B43 TR.) Give the reason for omitting any technical operations required in T.O. 11N-25-1, Table 2-3. State specific EOD operations observed; e.g., render safe procedures on specific type of weapon. If another unit or command was responsible for EOD or security support, include the following: THE INSPECTION INCLUDED AN EVALUATION OF THE TECHNICAL (EOD or SECURITY) SUPPORT PROVIDED BY (unit, base, and command). (Report findings in paragraphs 5 and 6 below, if applicable).

4. UNIT INSPECTION RATING: [For an INSI: READY or NOT READY; for an NSI or LNSI: SATISFACTORY, UNSATISFACTORY, or SATISFACTORY (SUPPORT UNSATISFACTORY.)]

5. LIMITING FACTORS: (If any, describe each problem in detail and indicate its effect on the unit mission. Identify the functional manager responsible for corrective action and indicate if the support organization or higher command failed to provide required support. Include appropriate references and describe corrective action taken during the inspection.)

6. CRITICAL/MAJOR DEFICIENCIES: (If any, describe as in paragraph 5 above. Identify any deficiency that has a major impact on nuclear surety or is a factor in a less than Satisfactory rating. Include appropriate references and describe any corrective action taken during the inspection.)

7. OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION: (Include MAJCOM special subjects related to nuclear surety that were evaluated. Provide concurrence or nonconcurrence statements from DTRA or AFSC for SIs or LNSIs.)

8. PROCESSING OF REPORT: (Report processing is required, when a critical/major deficiency is not corrected before the inspection is completed or when the corrective action is an interim measure. If required, specify items to be answered.)

Attachment 4**MESSAGE FORMAT (EXTRACT) FOR NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS**

FROM: (MAJCOM) IG TEAM (Base and Functional Address Symbol)

TO: (MAJCOM) (Base)//CC/(Appropriate Staff)//

(Numbered Air Force, if applicable) (Base)//CC//

(Wing, Group, or Squadron) (Base)//CC//

INFO: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//SEI/XOF/XON/ILMW//

HQ AFSC KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC/SEW//

HQ AFIA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC//

NCCS SUPPORT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//

OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IGI//

(Security classification) - (FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC

ENERGY ACT 1954, if applicable) - PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT--REF AFI 90-201

SUBJECT: INITIAL NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (INSI) EXTRACT REPORT

NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) EXTRACT REPORT

LIMITED NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (LNSI) EXTRACT REPORT

(Use appropriate subject.)

1. REFERENCE: (Include all applicable documents.)

2. THIS EXTRACT REPORT COVERS (LIMITING FACTORS or CRITICAL/MAJOR DEFICIENCIES) NOTED DURING AN (INSI, NSI, or LNSI) OF THE (unit and base) CONDUCTED ON (inclusive dates) ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201. THE INSPECTION TEAM CHIEF WAS (grade and name).

3. THE (unit) IS A TENANT ON (base). AS OUTLINED IN THE SUPPORT AGREEMENT (give a description of the agreement and the date), THE (organization) WAS RATED (rating). (Include the following, if applicable): THE (organization) HAS NOT FURNISHED ADEQUATE SUPPORT, WHICH RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING (LIMITING FACTORS or CRITICAL/MAJOR DEFICIENCIES): (Describe the limiting factors or critical/major deficiencies; identify the functional manager responsible for corrective action; and provide appropriate references.)

4. (Include remarks, if any.) (If applicable, provide the name of the representative from the MAJCOM not conducting the inspection as follows): THE (MAJCOM) REPRESENTATIVE (name) (CONCURRED or NONCONCURRED) WITH THIS EXTRACT REPORT.

5. PROCESSING OF THIS REPORT ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201, PARAGRAPH 3.9, (IS/IS NOT) REQUIRED.

Attachment 5**COMMON CORE CRITERIA (CCC)**

A5.1. Application. The following items represent key processes, procedures, and requirements that should be used to assess unit readiness. MAJCOMs may supplement this general guidance as required.

A5.2. Items Evaluated During Each Phase. Evaluate the following items during every phase of any readiness inspection or assessment.

A5.2.1. Threat. Is the unit able to implement and sustain appropriate measures to meet changing threat conditions?

A5.2.2. Safety.

A5.2.2.1. Assess how the organization adheres to safety guidelines and procedures to include Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and explosives safety standards (AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards* and AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*).

A5.2.2.2. Inspect a statistically valid sampling of Air Force munitions/weapons facilities (e.g., storage, maintenance, flight line) and work areas. As a minimum include these elements:

A5.2.2.2.1. Program Management. Evaluate effectiveness and completeness of unit inspection documentation, staff training, commander involvement (risk assessment), security, safety violations and projected corrective actions.

A5.2.2.2.2. Task Proficiency. Based on unit mission requirements, evaluate technical operations (peacetime and wartime), EOD mission taskings, and support functions as applicable.

A5.2.2.2.3. Explosive Safety. Explosive safety violations will be reviewed IAW AFMAN 91-201. Explosive safety site plans will be reviewed to ensure explosives storage and maintenance facilities are properly sited.

A5.2.3. Security.

A5.2.3.1. Were adequate security measures employed throughout the exercise?

A5.2.3.2. Were OPSEC procedures incorporated into plans and followed throughout the exercise?

A5.2.3.3. Were proper COMSEC materials available, as specified in tasked operations plans, to ensure mission accomplishment?

A5.2.3.4. Were COMSEC, COMPUSEC, and other measures employed to deny the enemy information?

A5.2.4. Communications and Information. Were communications and information operations effective?

A5.2.5. Training. Are units properly trained and equipped to perform wartime duties?

A5.3. Areas Evaluated in ORI Major Categories. CCC are applied to four major areas: Initial Response, Employment, Mission Support, and Ability to Survive and Operate. Within each, selected sub-areas are listed and general evaluation guidelines described. MAJCOMs should address these major areas

and subareas when applicable and supplement them as required to develop comprehensive inspections for assigned units.

A5.3.1. Initial Response.

A5.3.1.1. Command and Control.

A5.3.1.1.1. Is the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) reporting timely, accurate, and properly classified?

A5.3.1.1.2. Evaluate Unit Manning Document and Deployed Requirements Manning Document for accuracy.

A5.3.1.2. Deployment Processing.

A5.3.1.2.1. Is deployment planning comprehensive, timely, and responsive to taskings?

A5.3.1.2.2. Do the right people process with the required equipment and documents at the right time?

A5.3.1.2.3. Is transportation used efficiently, i.e., the minimum number of vehicles/aircraft to deploy the required people and equipment?

A5.3.1.2.4. Is the deployment process efficiently, effectively, and safely executed?

A5.3.1.2.5. Does the unit meet closure requirements?

A5.3.1.2.6. Are all reports accomplished in the required time?

A5.3.1.3. Deployment Processing Management.

A5.3.1.3.1. Does the DPU maintain accountability of people?

A5.3.1.3.2. Do they maintain and operate the MANPER-B systems to meet all reporting requirements?

A5.3.2. Employment.

A5.3.2.1. Command and Control.

A5.3.2.1.1. Are units capable of performing wartime or contingency taskings upon arrival?

A5.3.2.1.2. Does the unit successfully meet unified commander taskings by maintaining the capability as outlined in the unit's designed operational capability (DOC)/METLs?

A5.3.2.1.3. Check adequacy and security of command, control, communications, and computer procedures with other services, commands, and users.

A5.3.2.2. Operations.

A5.3.2.2.1. Evaluate the integration of deployed location procedures and requirements (including munitions storage and handling) into planning documents.

A5.3.2.2.2. Review application of unified commander's rules of engagement (ROE) for clarity and understanding within exercise constraints.

A5.3.2.2.3. Evaluate established search-and-rescue (SAR) procedures within exercise constraints (flying units).

A5.3.2.2.4. Evaluate levels of operations, equipment, and training to sustain wartime or contingency requirements.

A5.3.2.2.5. Evaluate weapon systems proficiency against required standards and taskings.

A5.3.2.2.6. Validate ability to efficiently manage the crew force.

A5.3.2.2.7. Evaluate efforts to meet air tasking order (ATO).

A5.3.2.2.8. Evaluate procedures and criteria for defensive counter information (DCI) operations events IAW AFD 10-20.

A5.3.2.3. Maintenance.

A5.3.2.3.1. Evaluate maintenance efforts to meet ATO or sortie generation on a daily basis.

A5.3.2.3.2. Validate not mission capable (NMC) rates due to supply and maintenance.

A5.3.2.3.3. Check performance of organizational, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance activities compared to established standards.

A5.3.2.4. Intelligence.

A5.3.2.4.1. Evaluate the following Air Force Intelligence Prioritized Tasks:

A5.3.2.4.1.1. Provide situation awareness, threat, and target status.

A5.3.2.4.1.2. Participate in development of air operations tasking order/space tasking order.

A5.3.2.4.1.3. Consolidate, prioritize, and validate collection requirements.

A5.3.2.4.1.4. Assess the timely transmission of intelligence information from mission debriefs (flying units).

A5.3.2.4.1.5. Consolidate and report battle damage assessments.

A5.3.2.4.1.6. Define requirements and manage inventory for targeting and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) products.

A5.3.2.4.1.7. Evaluate that national, theater, force, and unit level intelligence is coordinated and integrated into unit mission planning, execution, and mission effectiveness assessments.

A5.3.2.4.1.8. Evaluate threat assessment analysis for both air and ground forces.

A5.3.2.5. Weather.

A5.3.2.5.1. Evaluate the timeliness, accuracy, and meaningfulness of weather support to users.

A5.3.2.5.2. Evaluate the integration of strategic, operational and tactical weather information into unit's weather products.

A5.3.2.5.3. Assess weather force's ability to prepare weather products with limited amounts of data.

A5.3.2.5.4. Evaluate ability to accurately transmit tactical-level weather information in a timely manner.

A5.3.2.5.5. Assess the timely reception and transmission of weather information obtained from aircrew debriefs.

A5.3.2.6. Airfield Operations (Air Traffic Control and Airfield Management).

A5.3.2.6.1. Evaluate the ability of air traffic control to provide safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of aircraft during wartime/contingency taskings while adhering to USAF, FAA, DoD, and ICAO procedures.

A5.3.2.6.2. Evaluate the ability of airfield management to ensure adequate airfield facilities (pavements, signs, markings, etc.) during wartime/contingency taskings.

A5.3.2.6.3. Evaluate Airfield Operations emergency actions procedures and checklists.

A5.3.2.7. Aircrew Life Support.

A5.3.2.7.1. Evaluate the ability to provide aircrews with serviceable protective, survival, and rescue equipment.

A5.3.2.7.2. Evaluate the ability to provide deployment packages supporting 60 days of surge flying operations.

A5.3.2.7.3. Evaluate the ability to support aircrew chemical defense operations.

A5.3.2.7.4. Evaluate the effectiveness of aircrew and technician training programs.

A5.3.3. Mission Support.

A5.3.3.1. Command and Control. Do unit control centers ensure forces under their control collect, display, report and disseminate information which in turn initiates the appropriate plans, procedures, and implementing instructions to accomplish support taskings?

A5.3.3.2. Operations. Key functional areas or UTCs that need to meet unified command requirements are outlined in the following paragraphs.

A5.3.3.3. Personnel.

A5.3.3.3.1. Personnel Readiness Element (PRE): Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of all MANPER-B reports and support documents (e.g., orders).

A5.3.3.3.2. Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO): Does the PERSCO maintain accountability of deployed personnel? Are the MANPER-B system reports accurate and produced in a timely manner (e.g., personnel, casualty, and force management reports)?

A5.3.3.4. Civil Engineer.

A5.3.3.4.1. Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF): Assess capability to meet all theater requirements while maintaining a capability to deploy to another area if required.

A5.3.3.4.2. Prime BEEF Mobile Forces: Evaluate forces' ability to perform a variety of actions (as applicable). Emphasis should be given to the following: Damage Assessments, Repairs, Beddown, Minimum Operating Strip (MOS), Security, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Fire Protection, and CE Readiness.

A5.3.3.5. Services.

A5.3.3.5.1. Prime Readiness in Base Support (RIBS): Evaluate unit's ability to deploy and perform wartime duties specified in the UTC mission capability statement.

A5.3.3.5.2. Contingency Planning. Are unit emergency action procedures comprehensive and responsive to taskings? Support planning must include emergency response, strategic mission support and critical CONUS/OCONUS-sustaining missions.

A5.3.3.6. Air Base Defense (ABD).

A5.3.3.6.1. Assess the ability of ABD forces to plan and conduct force protection operations according to the designed operational capability statement, mission capability statement, and time-phased force deployment date tasking.

A5.3.3.6.2. Check individual and team proficiency to tactically employ assigned weapons, vehicles, communications, and equipment.

A5.3.3.6.3. Check for compatibility and interoperability of communication systems with other units, commands, services and national or theater assets.

A5.3.3.7. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C 4).

A5.3.3.7.1. Evaluate that timely and reliable communications links and local area networks are established and available.

A5.3.3.7.2. Check for compatibility and interoperability of communications systems with other units, commands, and services, as well as national or theater compatibility.

A5.3.3.7.3. Evaluate all back-up communications and computer systems to ensure adequate support to primary mission and/or command and control.

A5.3.3.7.4. Evaluate the protection afforded information systems and the information within those systems, to include network physical security, network intrusion protection, and protection of data during power interruptions.

A5.3.3.7.5. Evaluate the C⁴ restoral plan and the unit's ability to execute the plan.

A5.3.3.7.6. Review the unit's emergency action procedures and ability to execute.

A5.3.3.7.7. Evaluate network management and personal computer support.

A5.3.3.7.8. Evaluate that deployed communications-computer capabilities and support equipment meet mission requirements.

A5.3.3.8. Supply.

A5.3.3.8.1. Evaluate the adequacy of the supply system to meet user asset requirements.

A5.3.3.8.2. Check on-hand ammunition and spare assets against prescribed or authorized levels.

A5.3.3.8.3. Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of supplies and equipment.

A5.3.3.8.4. Evaluate ability to properly detect, sample, and analyze suspected fuel/cryogenics contamination.

A5.3.3.8.5. Evaluate compliance with all safety procedures and technical data during refueling and cryogenics operations.

A5.3.3.8.6. Assess proper fueling and loading procedures at all times.

A5.3.3.9. Transportation.

A5.3.3.9.1. Check maintenance and supply procedures.

A5.3.3.9.2. Evaluate the ability to meet user requirements.

A5.3.3.10. Medical.

A5.3.3.10.1. General Health Care Support: Evaluate triage discipline and direct emergency and primary medical and dental activities toward returning the greatest number of airmen to duty.

A5.3.3.10.2. Medical Treatment and Staging Facilities: Assess the ability to receive, re-triage, decontaminate, stabilize, transport, prepare, package, plan, and receive patients to ensure timely, quality care.

A5.3.3.10.3. Deployable Medical Elements: Evaluate ability to provide medical support to deployed flying, special operations, and support personnel to include food and water safety, immunizations, disease surveillance, emergency, outpatient-inpatient medical care and/or aeromedical evacuation of deployed personnel.

A5.3.3.10.4. Preventive Medicine: Assess the employment and implementation of preventive medicine initiatives to maintain force readiness of all unit personnel.

A5.3.3.10.5. In-place medical support: Assess ability of the medical unit or units to provide effective medical support to the commander "fighting the base" in place. This medical support should provide for effective resource protection while ensuring rapid and effective response to all contingencies including hazardous material exposures, mass casualty situations, terrorist threats/incidents, chemical/biological threats, air base survival and recovery. THREATCONs, natural disasters, and any other contingency requiring medical support.

A5.3.3.10.6. Aeromedical Evacuation: Evaluate ability to respond to the total spectrum of aeromedical evacuation to include inflight care and mission support that is safe and responsive to customer requirements.

A5.3.3.11. Legal Support.

A5.3.3.11.1. Evaluate the knowledge of assigned personnel concerning their responsibilities under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Have all personnel received LOAC training? Is specialized training provided to aircrews, medical

personnel, and Security Forces? Is timely and accurate advice supplied to commanders on LOAC issues?

A5.3.3.11.2. Evaluate unit rules of engagement. Do they satisfy the requirements of US law, policy, and international law?

A5.3.3.11.3. Is legal support adequate for wartime and contingency operations?

A5.3.3.11.4. Evaluate the availability of legal assistance for deploying personnel.

A5.3.4. Ability To Survive And Operate.

A5.3.4.1. Are appropriate plans established and actions demonstrated to sustain, defend, survive, and recover force capability within the assigned theater of operations (e.g., can the Survival Recovery Center (SRC) survive and operate in a hostile NBC environment and were self-aid/buddy care measures adequate to ensure mission accomplishment)?

A5.3.4.2. Are munitions storage and handling areas and fuel storage areas located where a weapons explosion (either accidental or enemy caused) will not destroy the unit's mission capability?

Attachment 6

COMPLIANCE INSPECTION ITEMS (CIIS)

A6.1. Compliance. The following minimum items are required by law, executive orders, DoD directives, and safety guidelines that, if not complied with, could result in significant legal liabilities, penalties, or mission impact. MAJCOMs should check Air Force-level compliance items during compliance inspections or other evaluations as appropriate, and may augment these items as determined necessary by the MAJCOM/CC. MAJCOMs are strongly encouraged to supplement these minimum requirements with specific compliance inspection items that ensure continued focus on mission capability and enabling support functions. Inspectors/assessors should review comparable inspections, unit metrics, and self-assessment results to help determine compliance with requirements. Rate each CII according to MAJCOM grading criteria. Where applicable, in compliance/not in compliance, satisfactory/unsatisfactory, pass/fail, etc. may be used.

A6.1.1. Environmental. (AFI 32-7045, *Environmental Compliance Assessment and Management Program (ECAMP)*)

A6.1.1.1. Assess the organization's managerial policy and program infrastructure to ensure compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local environmental standards.

A6.1.1.2. Evaluate the organization's ECAMP to include review of the organization's most recent Management Action Plan.

A6.1.1.3. Check the organization's Environmental Impact Analysis Process to assess whether decision-makers are protecting the environment to include floodplains, wetlands, historic sites, and endangered species.

A6.1.1.4. Evaluate the organization's participation in the installation's pollution prevention program to include recycling, affirmative procurement, waste minimization, hazardous material source reduction, hazardous material pharmacy, opportunity assessments, alternative fuels vehicle program, and pollution prevention management plans.

A6.1.2. Intelligence Oversight (Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*; DoD Directive 5240.1, *DoD Intelligence Activities*; AFI 14-1, *Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning*; AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*).

A6.1.2.1. Assess the intelligence unit's and staff's compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons (reference the checklist in AFI 14-104).

A6.1.2.2. Evaluate whether intelligence units and staffs have an adequate intelligence oversight program (reference the checklist in AFI 14-104).

A6.1.3. Victim and Witness Protection Program (DoD Directive 1030.1, *Victim and Witness Assistance*; DoD Instruction 1030.2, *Victim and Witness Assistance Procedures*; AFI 51-201, *Administration of Military Justice*).

A6.1.3.1. Assess that the installation's program complies with all statutes, directives, instructions, and Air Force policies.

A6.1.3.2. Evaluate procedures for notifying victims and witnesses of their rights under the program, including but not limited to, consultation with prosecutors, notification of case and prisoner status, as necessary.

A6.1.3.3. Evaluate training programs established for the following personnel and agencies: commanders, first sergeants, judge advocates, medical personnel, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) agents, Security Forces, chaplains, and personnel assigned to the Family Support Center.

A6.1.3.4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the installation's liaison with civilian victim assistance boards and agencies within the local community to ensure victims receive coordinated assistance and compensation from both military and civilian communities.

A6.1.4. Transition Assistance Programs (DoD Directive 1332.35, *Transition Assistance for Military Personnel*).

A6.1.4.1. Check availability and documentation of pre-separation counseling for members at least 90 days prior to separation.

A6.1.4.2. Determine if all members retired under the Temporary Early Retirement Act (TERA) are documented as confirmed registrants for Public and Community Service (PACS) prior to out-processing.

A6.1.4.3. Ensure DD Forms 2586, *Verification of Military Experience and Training (VMET)*, are issued to members.

A6.1.4.4. Assess the transition counseling and employment preparation program at military installations with more than 500 members assigned or serving.

A6.1.4.5. Determine if separating members' TAPs participation and mission requirements are deconflicted.

A6.1.4.6. Evaluate the allocation/availability of resources necessary to provide quality TAPs.

A6.1.5. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (Executive Order 13103, *Computer Software Piracy*; AFPD 33-2, *Information Protection*; AFI 33-101, *Communication and Information Management Guidance and Responsibilities*; AFI 33-112, *Computer Systems Management*; AFI 33-114, *Software Management*).

A6.1.5.1. Assess organization's adherence to information protection policies and procedures.

A6.1.5.2. Evaluate physical control and accountability of information systems and equipment.

A6.1.5.3. Evaluate compliance with software copyright provisions.

A6.1.5.4. Evaluate compliance with regulatory guidance regarding Communications-Electronic (CE) equipment inventory, status, and utilization reporting.

A6.1.6. Voting Assistance Program (DoD Directive 1000.4, *Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)*).

A6.1.6.1. Assess the organization's voting assistance program to ensure persons covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) are informed and provided year round opportunity to vote.

A6.1.6.2. Evaluate the Installation Voting Officer's allocation/availability of sufficient resources (including but not limited to funding, communication support, and voting materials) to conduct an effective voting program.

A6.1.6.3. Ensure installation commanders support Armed Forces Voters' Week publicity and voter registration efforts.

A6.1.7. Sexual Harassment Education and Prevention (*Secretary, Joint Staff Directive on Department of Defense Policy on Sexual Harassment, 21 Oct 98*).

A6.1.7.1. Evaluate sexual harassment education and training.

A6.1.7.1.1. Ensure military and civilian leaders are personally involved in training.

A6.1.7.1.2. Training must include instruction in understanding accountability and responsibility, characteristics of and prevention of hostile work environments, quid pro quo harassment, reprisal prevention, and the relationship between leadership and a professional organizational climate. Training should be provided to military members, civilian employees and local national employees at overseas locations when practicable.

A6.1.7.1.3. Ensure instructors are provided with skills and competencies necessary to deliver credible training.

A6.1.8. Safety (AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*; AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*).

A6.1.8.1. Assess how the organization adheres to safety guidelines and procedures to include applicable OSHA and explosives safety standards.

A6.1.8.2. Assess the unit's explosive safety program to assure mission success (i.e., an accidental explosion won't destroy mission capability).

A6.1.9. Homosexual Conduct Policy (Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness Memorandum on Implementation of Recommendations Concerning Homosexual Conduct Policy, 12 Aug 99; CSAF Memorandum on Homosexual Policy Guidance, 10 Mar 00).

A6.1.9.1. Evaluate the training of all those charged with implementing the homosexual conduct policy.

A6.1.9.1.1. Ensure that commanders, staff judge advocates, and investigators are trained on the DoD homosexual conduct policy.

Attachment 7

AIR FORCE BEST PRACTICE REPORTING FORMAT

1. POC's Name¹:
 2. POC's Phone Number:
 3. Name of the Process²:
 4. Name of Best Practice³:
 5. Date Best Practice was Implemented:
 6. Process Owner⁴:
 7. Process Owner's (or Representative's) Phone Number:
 8. Organization & Address (include zip code):
 9. E-mail Address of Process Owner (or Representative) (Optional):
 10. Summarize the Best Practice (*how* it works; how you *measure* it)⁵:
 11. Describe the *impact* on process/organizational performance (*results!*)⁶:
 12. Describe how this practice was qualified as being a "best" practice⁷:
- Validated by ⁸:
13. Name:
 14. Phone:
 15. Organization:

Notes:

1. This point of contact (POC) may be a supervisor, IG member, award team member or anyone knowledgeable of a best practice and permitted to share it outside the user's organization.
2. Identify the general activity where the best practice is found, for example, "...maintain equipment." (verb and noun).
3. A "Best Practice" is defined as a superior method or innovative practice that contributes to improved performance of the process.
4. "Process Owner" is defined as the person who coordinates the various functions and work activities at all levels of a process, has the authority or ability to make changes in the process as required, and manages the process end-to-end so as to ensure optimal overall performance. The process owner may designate the POC as his/her representative.
5. Submit completed records and, if necessary, additional materials (electronic version preferred) to: best-practice@afmia.randolph.af.mil or mail to AFMIA/MITT, Best Practices Team, 550 E Street East, Randolph AFB TX 78150-4451.

6. Describe in quantitative terms--may include reduction in costs, improvement in quality, or decrease in cycle time.
7. "Best" may be based on several factors to include but not limited to: **a.** expert review (for example, assessment, award, AF functional office, or auditing team); **b.** results are clearly superior to those of comparative organizations; **c.** results are "breakthrough" in efficiency/effectiveness (high return on investment); **d.** multiple sources agree the practice is superior; **e.** use of the latest technology; or **f.** high number of satisfied repeat customers.
8. Identify the individual (or group) who validated or designated the practice to be a Best Practice. The IG team chief will make the decision based on coordination with appropriate MAJCOM functional experts.

Attachment 8**EAGLE LOOK TOPIC PROPOSAL FORMAT**

Topic Title: Title, process, or program to be assessed.

Purpose: State specific result(s) the effort should address, what question(s) does the process/program owner want answered?

Background: Give a brief history of the issue and the Air Force leadership's interest in AFIA conducting this review. Include the results of initial research (if any), other staff work, and any metrics or other indicators that help describe the background and frame the issue. If the issue has been assessed previously by AFIA, AFAA, GAO, or any other agency, please identify the agency and the date of the assessment.

Scope: The parameters of the area to be assessed.

Focus: Where should the review focus its look?

Breadth: Describe the breadth of the problem in terms of how far across the Air Force the topic applies. To what depth should the review go? Is the topic DoD/AF wide or MAJCOM specific? Is it cross functional or functionally specific? Be specific.

Methodology: Is there a specific methodology recommended for gathering topic information? Are there specific boundaries that should apply when conducting the review?

Rationale:

Significance: Describe the seriousness of the problem or the size of the issue. Does it have an impact on AF core competencies (i.e., information dominance, air and space superiority, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, readiness and sustainment, agile combat support, global attack), essential support services, or Air Force key processes? If possible, quantify in terms of dollars, personnel, work hours, percentages, etc. Be specific.

Timing: State when the final report is needed and the associated rationale.

Point of Contact: Provide action officer's name, symbol, DSN number, and E-mail address.

Process Owners (If known, include 2, 3 and 4 digit): Provide process owner's name, office symbol, DSN number, and E-mail address.